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Abstract—A challenge in facilitating spontaneous mobile interactions is to provide pairing methods that are both intuitive and secure.
Simultaneous shaking is proposed as a novel and easy-to-use mechanism for pairing of small mobile devices. The underlying principle
is to use common movement as a secret that the involved devices share for mutual authentication. We present two concrete methods,
ShaVe and ShaCK, in which sensing and analysis of shaking movement is combined with cryptographic protocols for secure
authentication. ShaVe is based on initial key exchange followed by exchange and comparison of sensor data for verification of key
authenticity. ShaCK, in contrast, is based on matching features extracted from the sensor data to construct a cryptographic key. The
classification algorithms used in our approach are shown to robustly separate simultaneous shaking of two devices from other
concurrent movement of a pair of devices, with a false negative rate of under 12 percent. A user study confirms that the method is
intuitive and easy to use, as users can shake devices in an arbitrary pattern.




FOR mobile users, it is of potentially great value toassociate a personal device with another mobile device
in a spontaneous manner, without need for the involved
devices to have prior knowledge of each other. Spontaneous
associations can be for the purpose of short-lived interac-
tions, for example, file transfer, synchronization and
payment, or aimed at longer lived pairing, for example, of
a device with an accessory. Wireless ad hoc networks
provide for spontaneous discovery and interaction, but the
wireless nature of the link gives rise to problems of
authentication and security [1]. A first problem, resulting
from the invisibility of the link, is for users to ascertain that
their device associates with the intended target device, and
not with another entity discovered on the network [2]. A
second problem, due to the inherent susceptibility of
wireless communication to attack, is the risk that a third
party can gain control over the communication by establish-
ing itself as man-in the-middle (MITM) between the user’s
device and the intended target [3].
Authentication of all potential peer devices via trusted
third parties is impractical in a mobile computing world
with pervasive interaction opportunities [4]. Instead, secur-
ity needs to be bootstrapped directly between the involved
devices, under the control of the user. This requires an out-
of-band mechanism alongside the wireless channel, over
which material for key generation and verification can be
exchanged without risk of manipulation by an MITM. Any
such mechanism must be human-assisted and have the user
in the loop to control and/or verify that only the intended
devices communicate over the out-of-band channel. An
example of an out-of-band mechanism for peer device
authentication is PIN code entry by the user into the
involved devices [3].
A critical requirement for human-assisted device authen-
tication is ease of use and alignment with the user’s primary
goal of establishing interaction with another device.
Mechanisms such as key code entry can be acceptable for
occasional use in situations that motivate explicit attention
to security, but involve prohibitive overhead when users
seek to engage in fast and short-lived interactions. The
number of spontaneous interactions can be expected to
grow significantly as mobile devices and wireless networks
become ever more pervasive, and mechanisms for authen-
tication of such interactions must involve only minimal user
attention in order to scale for frequent use. An additional
challenge is that wireless devices increasingly vary in form
factor and user interface (UI). Specifically, smaller and more
specialized mobile and wearable devices cannot be
assumed to include key pads or displays—for instance,
headsets as mobile phone accessory, wireless heart rate
monitors, and mobile personal servers [5].
Authentication by shaking is a novel mechanism for
human-assisted authentication and secure pairing of mobile
devices. This new mechanism is defined by: the use of
common movement of devices as shared secret for their
mutual authentication; simultaneous shaking of devices as
user method to effect common movement; and embedded
sensing of device movement with a single accelerometer.
Authentication by shaking gives users explicit control over
pairing of devices with a simple gesture. Users are not
required to learn and perform any specific shaking gesture,
as the purpose of the gesture is to generate a one-time secret
between the devices that are shaken together. Shaking
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affords user control while eliminating the need for an
explicit user interface. Instead, the device-to-user interface
is reduced to an acceleration sensor coupled with a minimal
feedback channel (e.g., an LED or a beeper). This makes
authentication by shaking useful for a wide range of mobile
devices, from embedded “UI-less” devices such as sensor
nodes, portable hard drives, and wireless accessories to
mobile phones and handhelds, many of which are begin-
ning to be routinely equipped with accelerometers.
We introduce two concrete methods that use shaking for
authentication. The first method, ShaVe (shaking for verifica-
tion), is based on standard key agreement over an insecure
wireless channel with subsequent encrypted exchange of
accelerometer data. The devices use the sensor data to
independently verify that key agreement has taken place
with the intended target device, as identified by sufficiently
similar movement. The second method, ShaCK (shaking to
construct a key), represents an alternative approach in which
devices use accelerometer data to extract feature vectors as
building blocks for construction of a key. The feature vectors
are exchanged as candidate key material between the
devices in a cryptographic protocol that results in a shared
key only if there is a sufficient match of candidate material.
The two methods highlight design trade-offs: ShaVe uses a
conservative and better understood cryptographic design
and provides stronger security; ShaCK is computationally
less expensive and allows more dynamic interaction, for
example, shorter shaking phases if less security is required.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
reflect on the problem area and related work to position our
contribution. This is followed by an introduction to our
concept and overview of the concrete methods we
implemented (Section 3). The major components in our
approach are sensor data preprocessing (Section 4) as a
prerequisite for determining if sensor time series are
sufficiently similar (Section 5) and cryptographic protocols
for coupling secure channel keys with sensor data compar-
ison (Section 6). The algorithms for sensor data analysis are
evaluated in Section 7, followed by an evaluation on system
level, including usability study, embedded implementation,
and security analysis (Section 8).
2 RELATED WORK
The problem of peer device authentication for spontaneous
association of devices in wireless ad hoc networks was first
highlighted by Stajano and Anderson, in work that focused
on a security policy for spontaneous and transient associa-
tions [1]. The authentication and pairing mechanisms that
have since been investigated can be grouped into three
different approaches: human verification of target authen-
ticity based on direct output of the involved devices; direct
user input of authentication material into the involved
devices; and user selection of target devices over physically
constrained channels.
The first approach, human verification, can be thought
of as interactive challenge-response protocol, with the user
in the role of verifying device responses. Most state-of-the-
art methods rely on visual output, for example, displaying
of six-digit codes in the numeric comparison mode of
Bluetooth Simple Pairing [6], words from a dictionary as in
DH-SC [7], and “Random Art” visualizations of hashes
proposed to make the user’s comparison task easier and
more robust [8]. The use of visual output limits the range of
target devices to ones that reasonably include a screen
component. However, it has also been proposed to use
blinking patterns of LEDs for verification of device
authenticity [9], [10]. An alternative is auditory device
feedback, for example, speech generated by target devices
in the “Loud and Clear” protocol [11], however, with the
limitation that sound generation can be disruptive and
inappropriate. In contrast to this range of methods,
authentication by shaking is cognitively less demanding
for the user as it does not involve any verification task.
In other approaches, the user is in the role of providing
explicit input into the involved devices to ensure that the
intended pair authenticates. A standard mechanism is
manual transfer of PIN codes and passwords [3]; Bluetooth
“passkey entry,” for instance, requires the user to type a
numeric code that is displayed on one device into the other
device. An alternative to keypad entry are synchronized
button presses that only require a single button for each
device or a visual indicator on one and a button on the other
[12]. It has also been suggested that instead of a code, one of
the devices could display a gesture for the user to perform
with the other device [13]. Our shaking-based mechanism
can be regarded as a method relying on user input, but it
differs fundamentally in not requiring the user to input any
specific code or secret; instead, user input generated by
shaking is random but simultaneous to the involved devices.
A range of methods have been proposed that employ
physically limited channels for out-of-band communication
between peer devices. In these methods, the user is in the
role of physically controlling that only the intended devices
are connected over such a channel. Balfanz et al. proposed
location-limited channels based on transmission media with
directed and limited propagation, and demonstrative identi-
fication of target devices by the user, for instance, by way of
pointing their device [14]. Physically limited channels
investigated for peer authentication include infrared beams
[15], laser beams [16], [17], ultrasound [2], [18], using
constraints such as distance bounding [7] and radio
environment comparison [19]. Examples for physical selec-
tion and control by the user include pointing of their
devices for target selection with laser or infrared [16], [17],
[15], simultaneous button press on the involved devices
[20], and use of a camera in their device to capture a visual
code on the target device [21]. Our approach builds on the
principal idea of limited channels and physical selection; it
introduces a movement-limited channel (Section 3.1), and
adopts shaking as a new user method for physical selection
of devices and control over their authentication.
The idea of shaking two (or possibly more) devices
together to pair them was first demonstrated in “Smart-Its
Friends” [22]. The technique was based on broadcast of
movement features over an insecure wireless channel and a
simple heuristic for comparison of reported movements,
without authentication of the involved devices. Closely
related are “Synchronous Gestures” which have been
proposed for setting up user interaction across devices,
exemplified with “bumping” of one display device against
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another to form a shared larger display [23]. Accelerometer-
based analysis of movement has also been investigated for
context sensing in wearable and pervasive computing, for
instance, to determine if devices are carried by the same
person [24]; to group devices that are moving together [25];
and to identify device usage by correlation with user-worn
sensors [26]. Of the movement analysis algorithms intro-
duced in these contributions, we are adopting Lester et al.’s
coherencemeasure [24] for comparing data time series in one
of our implementations.
Shaking of devices for the purpose of using shared
movement for authentication was originally introduced by
us in a conference paper on which this paper expands [27],
but has since been explored also by others. Kirovski et al.
present a method in which devices that are moved together
perform joint fuzzy hashing, similar in general design to the
second of our two methods, ShaCK, but with differences in
how key material is extracted from acceleration time series
[28]. Bichler et al. likewise present an approach in which
acceleration data is used for key generation, and in this
sense, also more closely related to our second method,
however using acceleration features in the time domain [29]
(whereas both our methods are based on features in the
frequency domain). Beyond these recent efforts, we con-
tribute an implementation of two alternative methods to
understand trade-offs in authentication based on acceler-
ometer data. Lastly, we note that device shaking and
rotating had also been proposed in prior work on pairing of
CPU-constrained wireless devices, however restricted to the
purpose of preventing that the involved devices are easily
distinguishable by signal strength [30].
3 AUTHENTICATION BY SHAKING
We introduce authentication by shaking as an approach to
secure pairing that is designed to exploit joint movement of
devices as shared secret. In this section, we discuss the
design of our approach, with respect to three principal
considerations: the use of shaking to create a movement-
limited channel; the use of accelerometers for embedded
sensing of movement (and the resulting need to reconcile
inherent variance in sensor data streams); and the use of
acceleration data in the authentication process, for key
verification versus key generation.
3.1 Creating a Movement-Limited Channel
Balfanz et al. defined channels as location-limited if they
have the property that human operators can precisely
control which devices are communicating with each other,
by way of using limited media and controlling the spatial
arrangement of devices (e.g., direct pointing of devices at
each other). Accordingly, we call a channel movement-
limited, if it affords precise user control over which devices
can communicate, by way of controlling their movement
and by using movement as shared secret.
We propose simultaneous shaking of devices held
together (in one hand) as concrete technique for creation
of movement-limited channels, because shaking has char-
acteristics on which we can build for easy-to-use and secure
authentication:
. Shaking is an intuitive gesture. Humans are familiar
with shaking as a form of physical interaction with
objects that is very common, does not require
learning, and is performed without cognitive de-
mand; shaking is hence natural and easy-to-use as a
user interaction technique [22].
. Shaking motion is vigorous and distinctive. Shaking
involves pronounced accelerations over a longer
duration than alternative gestures that could be
performed with two devices, such as bumping
together [23], allowing shaking to be separated
robustly from other motion patterns.
. Shaking movements are variant. Shaking is a free-form
gesture that naturally varies from one instance to
another. We presume and experimentally validate
(cf. Section 7) that this allows robust detection of
whether a pair of devices are shaken together or
shaken independently.
The mechanism we introduce is not prescriptive as to
how users have to shake devices in order to authenticate.
Specifically, users do not have to try and match any
particular pattern or rhythm, because the shaking gesture is
not used directly as a key but as a random shared secret.
There is also no attempt to identify and authenticate the
user on the basis of their shaking gesture; authentication is
between devices, with mutual identification based on an
ephemeral shared “shaking experience.”
3.2 Using Acceleration Time Series
We base our authentication mechanism on localized sensing
of movement with a single embedded accelerometer. This
allows devices to independently capture movement, and
specifically shaking, as a time series of acceleration values.
Independent sampling of acceleration data is critical for the
purpose of using movement as shared secret; any exchange
of raw data would compromise this. A consequence of
independent sampling however is that the time series are
not aligned for comparison. We address this, as detailed in
Section 4, with local preprocessing and normalization of the
acceleration data prior to their use for authentication. The
result of local processing are active segments of acceleration
time series detected as representing shaking movement.
The separately measured movement of devices that are
shaken togetherwill be similar but not identical. This is partly
due to the inherent imprecision of sensors but also due to the
slightly different trajectories that devices can describe during
shaking, dependent on how they are held together (e.g., think
of one device being on the inner curve and the other one the
outer curve of a shaking path). Authentication based on
captured accelerometer data therefore needs to accommo-
date a degree of variance, rather than strict matching of time
series.Wedo this in differentways in our twomethods: in the
ShaVe method, devices exchange acceleration data and then
apply a similarity measure and threshold; in ShaCK, devices
exchange variants of acceleration feature vectors and then
use the percentage of matches found as a similarity measure.
3.3 Key Generation versus Key Verification
An out-of-band channel can be used in two different ways
in the process of authenticating wireless devices. One way is
to directly exchange key material out-of-band to guarantee
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that key exchange occurs only between the intended
devices. An example is manual transfer of keys or of codes
from which keys are generated [3]. The other way is more
indirect: having devices first agree keys over the insecure
wireless channel and then using out-of-band communica-
tion to verify that the key has been exchanged with the
intended party. Examples include verification over visual,
auditory, and ultrasonic channels [8], [11], [18]. Direct key
agreement out-of-band cuts out the need for subsequent
verification, but the level of security can be limited by the
source data. The key verification approach is more complex
but the “strength” of the session keys is independent of the
out-of-band mechanism.
Shaking-based sensor data can be used for both key
generation and key verification. Acceleration data of
vigorous shaking has, as we will show experimentally,
sufficient entropy to provide material for robust and secure
key generation. However, acceleration data is naturally
constrained by user movement and measurement method;
keys generated from the data will therefore not be as strong
as ones resulting from key agreement over random
numbers. Intuitively, there is a trade-off between use of
sensor data for key generation as the more direct and
presumably computationally less expensive approach, and
its use for key verification following wireless key agreement
as the more conservative approach from a security point of
view. In order to explore this trade-off, we have designed
and implemented both alternatives, in two concrete
methods for shaking-based authentication.
The first method, ShaVe, is based on unauthenticated
key agreement with subsequent verification. The method
involves the following steps, as illustrated in Fig. 1:
1. generation of a secret key with Diffie-Hellman (DH)
key agreement;
2. encrypted exchange of “raw” active segments of
acceleration data via an Interlock protocol;
3. comparison of received data with locally captured
active segments using a coherence measure;
4. if the check is successful then the agreed key is
adopted as session key for secure communication.
In the second method, ShaCK, devices use accelerometer
data directly for interactive key construction. As illustrated
in Fig. 2, this involves the following:
1. continuous extraction of discrete feature vectors
from active segments of acceleration data;
2. in each time step, a set of variant feature vectors are
extracted as candidates for match-making;
3. exchange of feature vectors in an interactive crypto-
graphic protocol that uses matching candidates as
building blocks for a shared key;
4. if the protocol finds matching candidates at a
sufficient rate, then this will directly result in a
shared key after a number of iterations.
The two methods have in common that they build on
preprocessing of accelerometer data in the time domain to
detect and normalize active segments. In both methods,
further analysis is conducted in the frequency domain, in
ShaVe, for comparison of exchanged active segments, and
in ShaCK, for extraction of feature vectors. Frequency
domain processing has the advantage that it tends to be less
sensitive to minor skew in compared time series, as well as
to noise and offsets caused by uncalibrated sensors. In
ShaVe, frequency domain analysis is done in one pass over
a complete time series of acceleration values; in ShaCK, in
contrast, acceleration data is continually transformed to
produce a stream of feature vectors of equal bit length.
4 PREPROCESSING OF ACCELEROMETER DATA
Accelerometer data is captured and locally preprocessed in
three steps as shown in Fig. 3, to obtain normalized time
series that can be used subsequently for analysis of whether
devices have been shaken together.
4.1 Sensor Data Acquisition
Sensor data is captured as time series of acceleration values
in three dimensions, sampled at equidistant time steps. The
data must be captured independently by the involved
devices; any leak of this raw data would compromise its use
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Fig. 1. In the ShaVe method, accelerometer data is used for key
verification following key agreement over the wireless channel.
Fig. 2. In the ShaCK method, feature vectors are extracted from
accelerometer data and directly used for construction of a shared key.
Fig. 3. Local preprocessing of accelerometer data: capture of time series
in 3D, temporal alignment for segmentation, and spatial alignment for
combination into a single normalized data stream.
for mutual authentication as it could be exploited for side-
channel attacks [31].
Practical experience shows that sampling rates between
100 and 600 Hz are appropriate for capturing shaking. In
our experiments, we sampled at 512 Hz and analyzed the
impact of lower rates.
4.2 Segmentation for Temporal Alignment
As the devices sample accelerometer time series indepen-
dently, temporal alignment is required to facilitate compar-
ison. We use an event-based approach in which devices
detect the onset of a shaking event, and use this to segment
the data. Devices can detect the onset of shaking indepen-
dently which means that there is no need for explicit
synchronization between devices, assuming they are
equipped with sufficiently accurate real-time clocks to
ensure alignment within detected active segments. The
detected onset of shaking also serves as trigger to start the
authentication process, eliminating the need for any addi-
tional user input to indicate the intent to pair a set of devices.
The start of an active segment is detected when the
variance of acceleration data within a sliding window
exceeds a threshold. Empirically, best results for our
purposes have been obtained at a sampling rate between
f ¼ ½128; 512 Hz with a sliding window of v ¼ f=2 samples
(i.e., 0.5 seconds), and a normalized variance threshold
around T ¼ 0:045. The end of an active segment can be
determined when the motion subsides (this approach is
used in the ShaCK method) or can be defined by a fixed
segment length (this is applied in ShaVe, with segments of
3 seconds duration).
4.3 Normalization for Spatial Alignment
How a user holds two devices together can vary, and
independently recorded 3D acceleration time series will
therefore typically lack spatial alignment and not be directly
comparable. We address this by reducing the three dimen-
sions to a single one, combining the acceleration values
captured along the x, y, and z axes. A sample in the resultant
data stream represents the magnitude of the movement
vector while its direction is not used in the current
implementation. This means that information of potential
use for subsequent analyses is discarded but has the
advantage of low cost implementation, in comparison with
methods such as principal component analysis (PCA).
For combination of acceleration values across the three
dimensions, and for subsequent comparability of data
streams, raw samples are normalized to a range centered
around 0, i.e., ½a; a. We use a dynamic approach in which
sensor data is analyzed in a sliding window, first scaling
values from the sensor-specific range to ½0; 2a, and then
subtracting the sliding average separately for each dimen-
sion before computing the magnitude.
5 ALGORITHMS FOR DETECTION
OF SHARED MOVEMENT
Independently captured and preprocessed time series are
compared to determine if devices have been shaken while
held together. This is a binary classification problem to
separate the intentional “shaking together” of devices from
any concurrent but spatially separated shaking of devices.
We propose two alternative algorithms for classification,
both based on the correlation of active segments in the
frequency domain. The first algorithm produces a measure
of coherence, to directly indicate how similar two given time
series are, and is a building block for the ShaVe method
(shaking for verification). The second algorithm introduces
candidate feature extraction and measures similarity of
shaking movements in terms of matching features found in
the two time series. The first algorithm is focused on
deciding if devices have been shaken together, whereas the
second algorithm also produces candidate features suitable
for key generation. This second algorithm is hence used in
the ShaCK method (shaking to construct a key).
In both algorithms, the decision process needs to fulfill
two conflicting aims: 1) to be robust to small variations due to
slightly different device trajectories and sampling noise, and
2) to extract a sufficient amount of pseudo-randomness for
use in the authentication protocol. For secure authentication,
we require high entropy from an adversary’s point of view,
i.e., that any device that is not being shakenwith the intended
devices shall be sufficiently uncertain about those parts of the
sensor data that are used for deciding on similarity.
5.1 Coherence of Acceleration Time Series
We adopt a coherence function described by Lester et al. in
their work on using accelerometers to determine whether
devices are carried together [24]. The coherence function is a
measure of linear correlation of acceleration data in the
frequency domain. For computation of coherence, two time
series a and b are split into n (optionally overlapping)
averaged slices ak and bk, normalized by the signal power
spectra. The function is then approximated by the magni-
tude squared coherence (MSC):
Cxy fð Þ ¼ Pxy fð Þ
Pxx fð Þ  Pyy fð Þ ð1Þ
with (cross-) power spectra




xk fð Þ  yk fð Þ ð2Þ
computed over FFT coefficients xk fð Þ ¼ FFT ak tð Þ  h tð Þð Þ
and yk fð Þ ¼ FFT bk tð Þ  h tð Þð Þ using the standard von-Hann
window h tð Þ ¼ 1cos 2t=wð Þ2 .
Note that while the signals a and b in time domain are
real, their FFT coefficients x and y are complex, and x refers
to the conjugate complex of x. By using squared magni-
tudes, Cxy becomes real-valued. The significance of coher-
ence values depends on the number of averaged slices n:
the more slices, the lower the coherence values for the same
pair of signals. Therefore, ShaVe uses a constant length of 3
seconds as a compromise between sufficient variability for
robust classification respectively entropy from an adver-
sary’s point of view and quick user interaction. The final






Cxy fð Þdf: ð3Þ
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With this heuristic, Cxy is thresholded to decide whether
devices have been shaken together. Separation of “shaking
together” and “shaking independently” has been tested
with a range of parameter settings, showing effective
separation with a sampling rate of R ¼ 256 Hz, windows
of W ¼ 256 samples with an overlap of 7=8, and a cutoff
frequency of Fmax ¼ 40 Hz.
5.2 Candidate Feature Matching
The feature vectors on which the coherence algorithm
operates are based on continuous-valued FFT coefficients.
Even when devices are rigidly held together for shaking, the
feature vectors will naturally exhibit a degree of variance.
The principle underlying our second algorithm is to build
feature vectors based on quantified FFT coefficients so that
we can expect to find bit-equal matches of feature vectors as
indicator for coherent movement.
Our candidate feature extraction algorithm is based on
exponentially quantized FFT coefficients that are pairwise
added, as suggested by Hyunh and Schiele [32], and
empirically confirmed to be more effective than linear
quantization and unpaired use of coefficients. First, the
(nonaveraged) power spectrum is computed:
Pxxk fð Þ ¼ xk fð Þ  xk fð Þ ð4Þ
using FFT coefficients xk fð Þ ¼ FFT ak tð Þð Þ based on over-
lapping slices ak of the signal a without applying specific
windowing functions. These coefficients are pairwise added
Qk fð Þ ¼ Pxxk fð Þ þ Pxxk f þ Fð Þ; ð5Þ
where F describes the frequency resolution after FFT, i.e.,
the difference between two frequency bands. When aiming
for equivalence of feature vectors, there is however an
additional complication: small differences of values near the
boundaries of quantization bands can lead to different
feature values, although the FFT coefficients are only
marginally different. The proposed solution is to generate
M candidate feature vectors with different offsets with
respect to B exponentially scaled quantization levels:
8m:¼0...M1 vkm fð Þ :¼ b so that lmb  Qk fð Þ < lmbþ1 : ð6Þ
The quantization level boundaries lmb are computed as lmb ¼
ðPb1i¼0 2b þ om  2bÞ  max Qkð Þmin Qkð ÞB þmin Qkð Þ with offsets
om ¼ m2 M1ð Þ ranging from 0 to the value of the smallest
quantization band.
Given two acceleration time series, the similarity criteria
used with this algorithm is the rate of matches in a stream of
candidate feature vectors. Thresholding the rate at a certain
percentage produces a binary decision for the authentica-
tion protocol. In our experiments, detailed further below,
best results for distinguishing shaking together from
shaking independently have been observed with B ¼ 6
exponentially scaled quantization bands and M ¼ 4 candi-
date vectors, at a sampling rate of R ¼ 512 Hz with FFT
windows of W ¼ 512 (1/2 overlap) and a cutoff frequency
of Fmax ¼ 20 Hz.
6 AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
FOR SECURE PAIRING
We propose two different authentication protocols. The first
one is based on the well-known Diffie-Hellman and
Interlock protocols and used for a key verification approach
in combination with coherence analysis of accelerometer
data. The second one is a new protocol introduced for
generating keys from candidate material extracted from
sensor data streams, and in the context of this work, is
combined with the candidate feature extraction from
acceleration time series as described above.
6.1 Diffie-Hellman and Interlock*
for Key Verification
In the ShaVe method, accelerometer data is used for key
verification. Themethod adopts standardDHkey agreement
[33] followed by an exchange of preprocessed accelerometer
data that are secured with an Interlock protocol.
Using DH key agreement over an insecure channel,
devices A and B generate two shared keys KAuth and KSess,
one for authentication and the other as session key to
provide forward secrecy. The keys are secure in the sense
that it is impossible to infer one from the other but they are
not authenticated. Key agreement is hence followed by a
verification process to ascertain that the key is held by the
intended party, and to rule out any potential MITM. The
unique key property of DH guarantees that ifKAutha ¼ KAuthb ,
there can be no adversary E with KAuthe1 ¼ KAutha and
KAuthe2 ¼ KAuthb , and subsequently, no KSesse1 ¼ KSessa and
KSesse2 ¼ KSessb .
The verification is based on encrypted exchange of a
shared secret via an Interlock protocol [34]. The essence of
Interlock is that messages are split after block encryption,
and that devices are forced to send a part of their message
before they receive the next part, and thus, before they can
decrypt the whole message block. Interlock therefore
protects against an MITM: an adversary E between A and
B will not be able to decrypt a partial message, and both
forwarding of the original message without reencryption,
and forwarding of a newly inserted message will lead to
uncover E (in the first case, because A and B would not be
able to decrypt the reassembled message due to different
session keys, in the second case, because A and B would
note the modified message content when the decoded
sensor data streams are not sufficiently similar).
For use with sensor data streams as shared secret, we
introduce Interlock* as an extension of the original protocol.
In this variant, A and B encrypt their complete messages, i.e.,
the (zero-padded) acceleration data vectors a and b with
lengths of n andm blocks, respectively, with any of the well-
known block cipher modes. To prevent simple mirroring
attacks, the local device identifier (e.g., its unique Bluetooth
MAC address) is perpended to a and b. In our implementa-
tion of ShaVe, cipher block chaining (CBC) mode with a
random initialization vector (IV) is used. The resulting
cipher texts c and d with lengths of nþ 1 and mþ 1 blocks
are then split into two messages by concatenating the first
halves of all cipher blocks into the first messages A1 and B1
and the second halves of all cipher blocks into the second
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messages A2 and B2. This ensures that an adversary E
cannot decrypt any of the blocks, and is therefore barred
from learning any parts of the plain text messages.
After exchange and reassembly of messages a and b, A
and B each verify that the received identifier matches the
remote device and the received acceleration data is similar
to the locally captured data, i.e., that a  b. In our
implementation of the ShaVe method, the coherence
algorithm described above is used for this purpose. The
protocol however is more general and can be combined
with other criteria and algorithms for verifying sufficient
similarity of exchanged sensor data. Both devices finally
indicate success or failure of the verification to the other
device over the wireless channel and signal the outcome to
the user. User feedback can be minimal (e.g., green/red
LED) but is required both for usability (transparency of the
interaction state) and security (e.g., to signal failed key
verification in the case of an attempted MITM attack).
6.2 Candidate Key Protocol
In the candidate key protocol (CKP), a shared secret key is
generated directly from sensor data instead of by DH
agreement. As presented in detail in Appendix A, feature
vectors v are hashed to generate candidate key parts h. When
feature extraction produces multiple “parallel” feature
vectors vi for each time window in the sensor data, then
these serve as candidate key parts hi. The one-way hashes
are a simple way to communicate that a device has
generated a certain feature vector without revealing it. To
make dictionary attacks harder, the standard approach of
perpending random salt values s before hashing is used.
When B receives such candidate key parts from A, it can use
its own history of recently generated feature vectors LH to
check for equals. When B has generated the same feature
vector, it is stored in a list of matching key parts MC specific
to each communication partner. As soon as enough entropy
has been collected in this list, B concatenates all feature
vectors, appends a constant C, hashes the resulting string,
and sends a candidate key K to A. If no messages have been
lost in transit, A should be able to generate a key with the
same hash, and thus, the same secret key, which it
acknowledges to B. If messages have been lost, A can
ignore a candidate key and create its own later on.
CKP is a general protocol that can be used with any
feature vectors. Here, it is applied to quantized FFT
coefficients, which work well for accelerometer data. A
more thorough specification of CKP and a description of
implementation issues has been presented in another
publication [35]; a discussion of its security properties is
provided in the security protocol analysis below.
7 EVALUATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION
ALGORITHMS
An assumption underlying the concept of authentication by
shaking is that it is possible to robustly detect whether a
pair of devices have been shaken together, as opposed to
shaken independently. To validate this assumption, we
have collected multiuser data sets and evaluated the
classification algorithms introduced in Section 5. We have
used this data collection also to analyze the influence of a
variety of parameters on algorithm performance.
7.1 Design and Procedure
The design of our experiment was based on collection of
two data sets, representing the conditions shaking together
versus shaking independently. The aim of the experiment was
to test whether the algorithms introduced in Section 5 are
able to robustly detect the “positive” condition shaking
together. Both algorithms use thresholds for classification, in
the ShaVe method based on a coherence measure, and in
the ShaCK method based on a rate of matching candidate
feature vectors. The test hypothesis was therefore that
thresholds can be found for these values above which the
algorithms do not produce any false positives (i.e., any
misclassification of the “negative” condition shaking inde-
pendently as positive). The experiment further aimed to
identify parameter sets for the algorithms to minimize the
false negative rate (i.e., misclassifications of shaking together
as negative).
As apparatus for data collection, we mounted acceler-
ometers in a pair of ping-pong balls, fixated with
compressed foam (see Fig. 4). Ping-pong balls were chosen
as representative in size for mobile devices and accessories,
and because the ball shape did not constrain alignment;
this allowed for collection of a data set in which pairs of
accelerometers were randomly oriented with respect to
each other. In each of the balls, two ADXL202JE accel-
erometers were fixed at an angle of 90 degree so that all
three dimensions could be measured (the use of 2D
accelerometers was a pragmatic choice). The acceler-
ometers measured acceleration of up to 2 g in each
dimension, and their pulse-width outputs were set to a
sampling rate of about 600 Hz. Polling the outputs at
around 1 MHz provided a resolution of about 10 bits per
sample. The accelerometers were wired for the data
collection but the attached cables were lightweight,
flexible, and long enough so as not to disturb or limit the
movement of devices by the subjects.
The data collectionwas carried out in two separate phases.
In the first phase, data were collected from individual
participants to obtain a data set for the shaking together
condition. In the secondphase, datawere collected frompairs
of participants shaking devices simultaneously but indepen-
dently, to obtain data representing the “negative” condition.
For collection of the first data set, participants were
asked to shake the two ping-pong balls together but were
explicitly not instructed as to how to perform the shaking
movement. For each subject, 30 trials of approximately
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Fig. 4. Data collection was carried out with accelerometers mounted in
ping-pong balls, to allow for arbitrary spatial alignment of the sensors.
5 seconds duration were recorded, arranged as 5 trials each
with both devices in the left hand, both devices in the right
hand, one ball in each hand, while standing and while
sitting. For each trial, the balls were picked up from a table
and put down afterwards, so that the relative orientation of
the balls changed from trial to trial.
The collection of the second data set involved pairs of
subjects. The subjects were asked to shake one of the balls
each and to attempt to create the same movement. To
incentivize the participating teams, the data collection was
organized as a competition with a small price for scoring
the highest similarity in shaking movements. For each team,
20 trials of approximately 15 seconds duration were
recorded: a longer period than in the collection of data
from individuals to give the participants time to get
synchronized. The 20 trials were organized as 5 trials each
in which both subjects used their left hand, both their right
hand, one left and one right, and vice versa. For all trials,
the participants were standing and within close proximity
(1 meter) of each other. After each trial, the teams were
given immediate feedback on the similarity of their move-
ments, so that they could attempt to adapt their shaking
patterns with the aim to achieve a higher score.
7.2 Results
We recruited 51 participants locally in our University,
19 female and 32 male, aged between 20 and 58, including
students, researchers, office staff, and nonoffice workers.
All 51 subjects participated in the collection of the first data
set, resulting in 1,530 samples of shaking by an individual
subject. Two-thirds of the samples resulted from shaking
together in one hand (either left, or right) and were
classified as “positive” because authentication should
succeed for this condition. The remaining third resulted
from shaking of devices in one hand each and were
classified as “neutral” because authentication could succeed
(as the movement was performed by the same person) but
would not necessarily be expected to succeed. Of the
subjects, 24 participated also in the second data collection,
in 12 teams of two. Of the teams, 8 performed the complete
trial and the other 4 a smaller number of trials, with a total
of 177 data sets collected as “negative” samples for the
evaluation of our classification algorithms.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the performance of our algorithms in
terms of false positive and false negative rates, depending on
thresholds chosen for coherence and feature matching. The
main result, for our purposes, is that both algorithms can be
configured to robustly classify shaking events only as shaking
together if the devices have indeed been shaken by the same
person (i.e., thresholds can be set to robustly exclude false
positives). This is an important result, as it confirms the
utility, in principle, of shaking for secure authentication.
However, the two algorithms behave very differently.
The first algorithm evaluates coherence of shaking patterns
as a scalar measure of similarity (Fig. 5). As expected, the
higher the threshold, the lower the false positive rate but the
higher the false negative rate. The optimum for our purposes
is at a threshold of Cxy ¼ 0:72, where the false positive rate
drops to zero, while the false negative rate is still low at
10.24 percent. Applying this threshold in the ShaVe method,
all illegitimate authentication attempts are rejected, while
almost 90 percent of the legitimate attempts succeed.
The second algorithm evaluates similarity of shaking
movements in terms of the proportion of matching feature
vectors (Fig. 6). The false positive rate produced by this
algorithm drops with increasing threshold, but the false
negative rate is nearly constant, below 12 percent. Applied
in the ShaCK authentication method, this means that almost
90 percent of legitimate attempts produce a match for every
candidate feature vector, and that thresholding at a lower
proportion of matching features does not lead to any
improvement in terms of accepting valid attempts. The step
profile of the false positive rate is explained by the use of
B ¼ 6 quantization levels in the exchanged feature vectors.
Above a threshold of 0.88 for proportion of matching
feature vectors, the algorithm rejects any illegitimate
authentication attempt. However, as the false negative rate
does not increase with a higher threshold, the ShaCK
method can be configured to require a 100 percent matching
rate as authentication condition.
The analysis of the coherence of separately recorded data
streams requires, in contrast to candidate feature matching,
active segments of fixed duration. The results presented
above are based on our default approach of taking the first
3 seconds of any simultaneous shaking event. However, if a
shaking event has a longer duration, then it is also possible
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Fig. 5. The coherence-based algorithm used in the ShaVe method
rejects false positives above a threshold of Cxy ¼ 0:72, with a false
negative rate of 10.24 percent at this threshold.
Fig. 6. The matching features algorithm used in the ShaCK method
rejects false positives above a threshold of 0.88; the false negative rate
is nearly constant with a maximum of 11.96 percent.
to select active segments for coherence analysis that are
offset from the start of the event. Fig. 7 shows an analysis
based on the “negative” data set, with average coherence
values plotted for active segments that represent the first
3 seconds, the second 3 seconds, and so on, of independent
shaking by two subjects. The graph shows that the subjects
tend to loose synchronization the longer the common
movement needs to be sustained. This result suggests that
the separability of positive and negative conditions can be
further improved if common movement is evaluated only
after it has already been sustained for a few seconds;
however this would be at the expense of requiring users to
shake devices longer in order to achieve authentication.
The parameters of our algorithms have been derived
from an analysis of our data sets. For the coherence
algorithm, we adopted the parameter set that generated
the largest difference in coherence values between positive
samples and negative samples. For the candidate feature
matching algorithm, a parameter set was chosen that
minimized 4eP þ eN , with eP the false positive rate and eN
the false negative rate. Figs. 8 and 9 provide insight into the
influence of individual parameters on algorithm perfor-
mance. For the coherence algorithm, the sampling rate has a
significant influence on the difference in coherence mea-
sured for our two conditions, with the “gap” widening with
higher sampling rates but no further improvement from 256
to 512 Hz (Fig. 8a). In contrast, the choice of threshold used
for detection of the onset of a shaking event (i.e., the start of
an active segment) shows practically no impact on separ-
ability of our two conditions (Fig. 8b). For the cutoff
frequency used in the coherence metric, our analysis
confirms the intuitive correlation of better separation with
higher values but with decreasing significance from around
20 Hz (Fig. 8c). For the window size in the coherence metric,
best results were observed for values corresponding to the
sampling rate (Fig. 8d). Overall, the data show that the
coherence algorithm is robust against parameter variation
and provides separability of shaking together and shaking
independently irrespective of particular parameter settings.
The most significant parameters of the candidate feature
matching algorithm are the number of candidates and the
number of quantization levels used in the feature vector.
For the number of candidates, it is expected that the
matching rate increases with higher values, however, the
increase is not significant for more than four candidates
(Fig. 9a). The choice of quantization levels is particularly
critical for separability of our two conditions in terms of
matching rates, with best results observed for B ¼ 6 levels
(Fig. 9b). The sampling rate and cutoff frequency, on the
other hand, show limited influence on separability of our
two conditions (Figs. 9c and 9d). The data show that also
this algorithm is robust against parameter variation for
correct classification. However, as the algorithm is based on
discrete matching of features, the classification performance
is significantly more dependent on a “good” parameter
combination than is the case for the coherence algorithm.
8 SYSTEM EVALUATION
The first part of our evaluation has shown that the
algorithms used in our authentication methods can be used
to robustly differentiate whether devices have been shaken
together by an individual or shaken separately. In this
section, we evaluate our methods for authentication by
shaking on system level, with respect to three concerns: the
usability of the approach, the feasibility of its implementa-
tion in mobile devices, and the security of the two concrete
authentication methods, ShaVe and ShaCK.
8.1 User Study
8.1.1 Design and Procedure
A user study was designed to investigate how intuitive the
proposed method of shaking is for device pairing. The test
hypothesis was that users are able to learn the method with
minimal guidance and effort, and that they can apply the
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Fig. 7. The average coherence of consecutive three-second segments
extracted from independent shaking decreases significantly over the first
two segments.
Fig. 8. Analysis of the influence of selected parameters on the performance of the coherence algorithm: (a) sampling rate, (b) signal variance
threshold for segmentation, (c) cutoff frequency in the coherence metric, and (d) window size for computation of coherence.
method reliably after they have learnt it. As apparatus for
the study, the ping-pong balls previously used for data
collection were now connected to a “live” system for online
analysis of the acceleration time series (Fig. 10). The system
used both coherence and candidate feature matching in
parallel for the analysis. A simple graphical user interface
(GUI) showed the status of both devices (active/inactive)
and the values for coherence and feature matching rate,
highlighted with a green background for values above the
threshold and red background for values below, to indicate
authentication success or failure. The user interface was
updated whenever the algorithms produced a new results,
including when users continued to shake devices for longer
than a single trial.
The procedure for the user sessions was to very briefly
explain the experimental setup and to provide users with a
short list of hints on how to achieve successful pairing with
the shaking method: to align the devices along the move-
ment axis, to shake quickly and vigorously, and to keep the
wrist stiff and the elbow steady. The users were not given a
practical demonstration. They were then asked to try the
method with the aim to achieve successful pairing, and
keep trying in case they did not succeed immediately. After
the first successful authentication (simultaneously with
both methods, coherence and feature matching), partici-
pants were asked to reproduce this for at least two more
times. When participants did not achieve successful
authentication after 10 attempts (about 1 minute), they
were shown once how the experimenter performs the
method for successful authentication, and following the
demonstration asked to try again.
8.1.2 Results
A total of 30 participants (12 females, 18 males), aged 24 to
over 50, took part in the study, recruited from staff,
students, and visitors in our University. Of the participants,
70 percent had taken part in the previous data collection,
and therefore, had already seen the sensing devices before.
The results of the user study are summarized in Table 1.
As shown, 8 of the participants (26.6 percent) were able to
immediately and reproducibly achieve successful authenti-
cation for bothmethods starting with their first try. A further
10 participants (33.3 percent) acquired the method success-
fully by trial and error, 8 within five attempts (about half a
minute) and the other two within 10 attempts (about one
minute). Of the remaining participants, seven (23.3 percent)
were able to reproducibly achieve authentication after they
were given a demonstration of a successful attempt by the
experimenter, within at most three further attempts follow-
ing the demo. The remaining five participants (16.7 percent)
only achieved hits with either of the two methods (two only
with ShaVe, three only with ShaCK), but did not succeed in
reproducible authentication with both methods.
The main result of the study is that most users learn to
use the shaking method for secure pairing with minimal
preparation: a brief phase of trial and error, or a single how-
to demonstration. This confirms that the method is intuitive
and can be mastered by users without an explicit training
phase. However, the study also shows that some users
found it difficult to use the method successfully. We
observed that unsuccessful users were inclined to shake
carefully (i.e., with limited vigor) and/or with a strong
rotation element in their movement, which are both
detrimental to detection of shaking together.
8.2 Feasibility of Embedded Implementation
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach to
authentication on mobile devices, we have implemented the
ShaVe method on the Nokia 5500, a state-of-the-art mobile
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TABLE 1
Preparation Required by Users to Learn the Shaking Method
Fig. 10. Experimental setup for the user study: sensors embedded in
ping-pong balls connected to a system that provided real-time feedback
on authentication success or failure.
Fig. 9. Analysis of parameters used in the candidate feature matching algorithm: (a) number of candidate feature vectors, (b) number of quantization
levels used in feature vectors, (c) sampling rate, and (d) cutoff frequency.
phone (Fig. 11). The ShaCK method would offer more
dynamic interactions but requires wireless broadcast
capabilities for direct implementation, which Bluetooth
lacks. The Nokia 5500 series has a built-in 3D accelerometer
that facilitated implementation of our method without any
extension or modification of the mobile phone hardware.
The implementation is based on a background Symbian
application that is started automatically and uses the Nokia
Sensor API to access the accelerometer data at its preset
sampling rate of about 30 Hz. This sampling rate is
significantly lower than the sampling rate that had been
identified as best-performing in the experiments reported
above. At this lower rate, shaking together and shaking
independently can still be robustly distinguished at a lower
coherence threshold, however, the false negative rate is then
expected to be higher than in our experiments (i.e., a higher
rate of rejecting valid attempts).
The core of our implementation is a Java MIDlet that
connects via a local TCP socket to the Symbian background
process. The MIDlet contains the code for processing of the
acceleration data and uses Bluetooth RFCOMM commu-
nication for implementation of the key verification protocol.
The use of Bluetooth as a wireless communication channel
posed challenges, as Bluetooth lacks broadcast or multicast
support, and because of the latency of inquiry and service
discovery. We addressed this by performing the first phase
of ShaVe, i.e., the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, opportu-
nistically. Whenever a compatible device is found by the
regular background inquiry process, an unauthenticated
secret shared key is established with it. The second phase,
key verification, is started as soon as a valid active segment
has been detected and recorded. The acceleration data is
encrypted and securely exchanged with all devices for
which a shared key was generated in the first phase.
Although the messages are distributed to potentially multi-
ple devices, only the pair that has been shaken together will
authenticate their secret shared key.
Cryptographic operations and signal processing ob-
viously bear a cost; as an indicator for the performance of
the embedded implementation on off-the-shelf mobile
phones, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement phase takes
about 6 seconds, with 4 seconds for computation and
2 seconds for transfer of key material via Bluetooth. The
key verification phase is significantly faster with practically
no delay for AES encryption, and about 1 second for
Bluetooth transmission of encrypted active segments. All
cryptographic primitives rely on integer operations and can,
in practice, be executed on arbitrary CPUs. On modern
mobile phones with CPU clock rates of 100 MHz and above,
asymmetric cryptography (includingDiffie-Hellman as used
in ShaVe) is feasible without specialized hardware support.
A significant cost is associated with sensor data proces-
sing as this requires floating point operations. These are
costly on embedded CPUs without hardware floating point
units, and for our demonstrator, we therefore converted the
algorithms to deal with integer operations only. FFT and
coherence however are computed with floating point
numbers and double accuracy, which takes about
0.3 seconds in our implementation on the Nokia 5500. On
dedicated DSPs or processors with signal processing
support, FFT computation cost would be lower and feasible
on more resource-limited devices.
A further cost factor is wireless transmission. ShaVe
always requires eight messages for a complete protocol run
(two for key agreement, four for verification via interlock,
and two for the final acknowledgment). The size of
interlock verification messages depends on how long
devices were shaken, and therefore, scales linearly with
the entropy (and in this case, security against online
attacks). For ShaCK, messages sizes are constant, but the
number of candidate key part messages scales with the
shaking duration (and thus with the security against online
and offline attacks). At a minimum, ShaCK will transmit 6
messages (which are shorter than those in ShaVe), but with
no upper limit.
For overall cost analysis, it is important to note that
shaking for pairing will occur infrequently and only as
short burst of activity. In the normal lifecycle of embedded
devices such as mobile phones and accessories, impact on
battery life is therefore expected to be negligible.
8.3 Security Analysis
In the following discussion, we assume an adversarial
model similar to the one used by Vaudeney [36]. That is, the
adversary has full control over the wireless channel,
including reading, modifying (data or address of) a
message, replaying, preventing delivery, or injecting com-
pletely newmessages. Additionally, the adversary may start
new protocol instances (by injecting appropriate authentica-
tion request messages) with multiple legitimate devices in
parallel—especially with two devices being intentionally
shaken together by the user. Although the adversary may
also monitor all legitimate devices, we assume that they can
neither control the acceleration experienced locally by these
devices nor perfectly estimate it.
8.3.1 Threat Scenarios
The primary threat for authentication is an active MITM
attack. For ShaVe, MITM attacks on the wireless channel are
prevented by the key verification phase binding the agreed
session keys to sensor time series that are verifiable by both
devices. An attacker might succeed in completing the
Interlock exchange of sensor data (by sending a junkmessage
after receipt of the first part of the data) but the receiving
device would detect the attack and signal this to the user. For
ShaCK, session keys are not explicitly negotiated, but are
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Fig. 11. The ShaVe method was fully implemented on off-the-shelf Nokia
5500 mobile phones to demonstrate feasibility on mobile devices.
computed internally based on matching received key
material with local sensor time series. These keys are
therefore resistant to classical attacks on key agreement.
As our authentication methods are based on shared
movement, we need to consider three particular threat
scenarios for the detection of such shared movement. First,
devices may be accidentally paired by unintentional joint
movement. This threat is prevented in ShaVe and ShaCK by
minimum thresholds on both shaking time and vigor, so
that unintentional movement is highly unlikely to generate
acceleration patterns that are detected as active segments.
Second, an adversary may try to physically copy the
movements of legitimate users, for example, while they are
attempting to pair devices. This threat is addressed by
robust classification of shaking together versus shaking
independently as analyzed above in Section 7. Our analysis
shows that our decision algorithms can be parametrized to
prevent false positives, even for the case of two users
actively collaborating to “fool” the system by attempting to
perform the same movement. We conclude that an adver-
sary who might try to perform the same shaking movement
as the user (without their cooperation) would not succeed in
producing a sufficiently similar sensor data.
Third, an adversary may try to estimate the accelerations
the attacked device is experiencing, for example, based on
video analysis, and fabricate their own time series to be
sufficiently similar for successful authentication by the
other device. The basic assumption of ShaVe and ShaCK is
that there are sensor data that the legitimate devices can
capture with better accuracy than any adversary. The
devices measure their acceleration as a physical phenom-
enon that is local and which an adversary cannot directly
access or reasonably influence. To prevent the threat of
“guesstimating” acceleration time series, the most impor-
tant point is to achieve high entropy with regards to a
possible adversary’s knowledge. A key can only remain
secret if the adversary is sufficiently uncertain about it.
Interactive cryptographic protocols can “stretch” this
entropy when creating a key, but they still require sufficient
uncertainty so that an adversary can not estimate the whole
sensor time series during a single authentication protocol
run. The main difference between ShaVe and ShaCK in this
respect is their resistance against offline guessing attacks.
8.3.2 Resistance of ShaVe against Guessing Attacks
ShaVe uses two phases, key agreement and key verification,
and thus offers a potential adversary only a single, one-off
chance—to estimate the respective sensor time series closely
enough and online during the protocol run—to undetect-
edly mount an MITM attack. When the messages sent in the
Interlock* protocol, that is, the active segments extracted
from acceleration time series, each have an entropy of e bits
from the adversary’s point of view, this leaves a single 2e
chance of remaining undetected. We can currently not
quantify the entropy of these messages, but a guessing
attack seems prohibitively unlikely in practice. Note that,
even with e less than 128 bits, the created session keys will
still offer the full security level (assuming DH to be secure).
8.3.3 Resistance of ShaCK against Guessing Attacks
For ShaCK, the security level of this CKP-based protocol is
directly limited by the entropy of all collected feature
vectors and is susceptible to offline brute-force attacks (cf.
the security analysis in [35]). This is due to relying solely on
symmetric cryptographic primitives. By optionally using
any standard password-based key agreement protocol such
as the MANA family of protocols [37] with the candidate
key K as common, secret input, ShaCK could also be
hardened against such offline attacks. However, this
requires the introduction of asymmetric cryptography with
the associated computational cost. We therefore analyze the
security of ShaCK without this optional protocol run and
note that, when offline security against brute-force attacks is
required, ShaVe or ShaCK with an added asymmetric key
agreement protocol should be used.
The problem arises when parts that are extracted from
sensor time series only have a small entropy from an
adversary’s point of view. In this situation, even when
reversing the hash function is impossible, the adversary
could just generate lookup tables of all possible time series
parts and compare their hashes with the received candidate
key parts. This is slightly mitigated by the use of salting, but
only makes the attack more computationally expensive, and
not less likely to be successful. An adversary only needs to
keep a small amount of possibly matching key parts in a
history to try and create keys that match the transmitted
messages, in much the same way that is also used in the
legitimate protocol run. For this reason, it is better to
transmit fewer but larger candidate key parts to construct a
key. When the sensor time series parts that can be extracted
naturally using domain specific knowledge only have a
small entropy, then multiple such parts should be buffered
and bundled into one candidate key part. This does not
reduce the overall entropy collected from as much sensor
data as possible, but makes attacks on the transmitted parts
harder. Guessing a candidate key part and verifying that it
matches its received hash value has an average complexity
of O 2e1ð Þwhen the feature vector has e bits of entropy from
the adversary’s point of view. Thus, two concatenated
feature vectors would need O 22e1ð Þ steps to guess.
For an estimate of the entropy e of quantized feature
vectors used for ShaCK, we further analyzed the collected
shaking data. Using the parameters found with the first two
data sets but 256 Hz instead of 512 Hz sample rate,
quantized FFT coefficient vectors were computed over all
1,530 samples. This parameter combination generates
feature vectors of 21 discrete values from 0 to 5. Each
subject generated, on average, 526.86 different feature
vectors, with a minimum of 140 and a maximum of 1,037.
Aggregated over all subjects, there were 5,595 different
vectors for the left hands, 4,883 for the right, and 7,988 and
7,770 for devices 1 and 2, respectively. Overall, 12,220
different feature vectors were generated during the first
experiment, corresponding to an entropy of ld12; 220 ¼
13:58 bits per feature vector. If an adversary is assumed to
know which device, person, and hand are involved in a
protocol run, this entropy decreases to around 7 (for the
subject generating only 140 different feature vectors,
pessimistically reduced by the assumption of which device
and hand was used) to 10 bits (for the single subject with
1,037 different vectors). Overlapping feature vectors will
have even less entropy, but we currently assume ShaCK to
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generate 7 bits entropy per second, and thus, to achieve a
security level of 128 bits after around 20 seconds. Powerful
motion-based estimation methods, for example, based on
video analysis, may give adversaries additional information,
and thus, reduce their entropy further. However, such an
attack seems unlikely in practice. Users or applications may
choose lower (or higher) security levels simply by deciding
how long devices should be shaken.
A potential concern is that secure hash functions, the
cornerstone of the CKP design, have been subjected to
considerably less theoretical analysis than other crypto-
graphic primitives. ShaVe also uses hash functions but only
to derive symmetric session keys from Diffie-Hellman keys,
and thus, seems less vulnerable against potential future
attacks on hashes than ShaCK.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced authentication by
shaking as a novel concept for pairing of mobile devices.
We have developed and validated algorithms for robust
classification of shaking movement, and contributed proto-
cols that interweave sensor data analysis with crypto-
graphic techniques for authentication. The key findings of
this research are that authentication by shaking can provide
strong security for device pairing; that the technique is
intuitive and easy to perform by users; and that it is feasible
to implement the approach on mobile embedded platforms
with minimal input/output capacity.
The discussed research provides insight into alternative
designs for authentication by shaking. The two concrete
methodsdeveloped in thiswork are basedon the same sensor
data as input but combine data analysis and cryptographic
protocols in very different ways. ShaVe is based on con-
secutive steps of speculative key agreement, exchange of
sensor data, and finally, independent verification of the
agreed key. This conservative method results in strong
security but is more rigid with consecutive phases, and
predefined length of sensor time series required for compar-
ison. Note that the independent and noninteractive compar-
ison of “raw” sensor data allow devices to apply different
methods for key verification, and thus, affords a significant
advantage for interoperability and different security levels.
ShaCK, in contrast, follows a pipeline design, with feature
extraction, exchange of candidate features, and key construc-
tion stages. The result is a very interactive technique where
sensor data is continually processed, andwhere a shared key
is gradually built up the longer a pair of devices are shaken
together. If strong security isdesired, ShaCKrequires shaking
over a longer duration than ShaVe. However, ShaCK
provides the flexibility to compromise key strength for faster
authentication and can be more efficient than ShaVe if
security comparable to four-digit PIN codes is sufficient. A
specific advantage of ShaCK is the immediacy of user
feedback, configurable to signal success as soon as a target
level of security has been reached (whereas ShaVe involves
inherent latency as data is analyzed over time windows of
several seconds).
The security of the proposed method depends on the
combination of algorithms for data analysis and crypto-
graphic protocols. However, the design is modular with a
clear separation of data capture, data analysis, and
protocols. Performance improvements can be achieved, for
instance, in data preprocessing (e.g., to obtain higher
entropy or limit off-center rotational effects) without
modification of protocols, and only limited impact on
classification algorithms. The data analysis algorithms are
developed specifically for acceleration time series, but the
cryptographic protocols could also be used with other
sensors and data analysis methods.
Based on the reported results, we would expect improve-
ments from spatial alignment of sensor data in three
dimensions. Presently, only the magnitude of acceleration
values is captured, and the direction of the vectors could
contribute significantly to theoverall entropyand the security
of our authentication method. This can be approached with
modeling of movement in 3D and estimation of relative
spatial alignment between the devices, to reconcile the local
and remote sensor time series. For practical deployment, it
may also be relevant to support negotiation of parameters for
data analysis and for required security.
Authentication by shaking is well suited to pairing of
small-size devices that can be held together in one hand.
Secure pairing is specifically relevant for personal devices,
such as health monitors worn on the body, or smart cards
and pass keys. The hardware requirements for the proposed
technique are minimal; a single accelerometer is required to
capture movement, and an LED, beeper or vibrator, would
suffice for user feedback. Many mobile devices already
incorporate the required hardware, as demonstrated for
mobile phones, and it is reasonable to expect wider
deployment of movement sensors in devices for a variety
of purposes (e.g., device monitoring, gesture detection,
context-awareness). A potential limitation for deployment
on very small devices are the computational resources
required for advanced data analysis. The impact on battery
lifetime of embedded devices, however, is considered
minimal, as shaking-for-pairing involves only short bursts
of sensor, CPU, and radio usage.
This work has explored use of movement as evidence for
securing spontaneous device association. A challenge in
future work is to advance toward more principled under-
standing of how sensing of physical phenomena can
contribute to practical security in mobile and ubiquitous
computing.
The data sets and source code of prototype imple-




Figs. 12 and 13 show the detailed specifications of the
cryptographic protocols for ShaVe and ShaCK, respectively.
For the formal descriptions of the protocols, the following
notations are used: c ¼ EðK;mÞ describes the encryption of
plain text m under key K with a symmetric cipher, m ¼
DðK; cÞ the corresponding decryption, HðmÞ describes the
hashing of message m with some secure hash, and mjn the
concatenation of strings m and n. The notation M½a : b is
used to describe the substring of a message M starting at
bit a and ending at bit b. The symbol  describes bitwise
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XOR and jSj the number of elements in a set S. If a message
M is transmitted over an insecure channel, the received
message is denoted by eM to point out that it may have been
modified in transit, by noise or attack. Subscripts denote
the different sides (a or b for an authentication between A
and B) while superscripts denote specific vectors in a set of
vectors. The syntax bx denotes the (open) result of a search
for matches in a set. When a hash is computed from a set of
vectors, this means the concatenation of all vectors in some
predefined order, typically by their round number. C refers
to some publicly known constant. AES is used as as a block
cipher for E and D and SHADBL  256 as a secure hash for
H, which is a double execution of the standard SHA 256
message digest to safeguard against length extension
and partial-message collision attacks and is defined as
SHADBL  256 mð Þ ¼ SHA 256 SHA 256 mð Þð Þjmð Þ.
MAYRHOFER AND GELLERSEN: SHAKE WELL BEFORE USE: INTUITIVE AND SECURE PAIRING OF MOBILE DEVICES 805
Fig. 13. ShaCK protocol: candidate key protocol (CKP) for directly creating a secret key from common feature vector hashes.
Fig. 12. ShaVe protocol: Diffie-Hellman key agreement followed by exchange of the complete time series via Interlock*.
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